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Political theorists in the last quarter century have been primary custo­
dians of a conception o f the political as an active, participatory, and rational 
activity o f citizens. This conception contrasts with the concept of politics 
usually assumed by popular opinion, journalism, and much political science. 
By politics these often m ean the competition of elites for votes and influ­
ence, and processes of bargaining and among those elites about the shape 
of policy. H annah A rendt’s work remains a milestone in twentieth century 
political theory because she gave us an inspiring vision of the idea of the 
political as active participation in public life that many political theorists 
continue to guard and preserve.
In that vision the political is the most noble expression of hum an life, 
because the m ost free and self-determining. Politics as collective public life 
consists in people moving ou t from their private needs and sufferings to 
encounter one ano ther in their specificity. Together in public they create 
and recreate through contingent words and deeds the laws and institutions 
that govern and frame their collective life, the resolution to their ever-re­
curring  conflicts and disagreem ents, and the narratives of their history. 
Participation in such public life makes a world for people, where things and 
ideas are affirmed as real by virtue of appearing in that public affirmed by 
a plurality o f subjects; that same public appearance affirms the reality of 
the individual person, who acts through speech. Social life is fraught with 
vicious power com petition, conflict, deprivation, and violence, which always 
threaten  to destroy political space. But political action sometimes revives, 
and through a rem em brance of the ideal of the ancient polis we maintain 
the vision o f hum an freedom  and nobility as participatory public action 
(Arendt, 1958).
A rendt distinguished this concept of the political from the social, a 
m odern structure o f collective life which she believed increasingly eclipsed 
the political. In the m odern world institutions, economic forces and mass 
movements collude to create a realm of need, production and consump­
tion outside the family. Government institutions increasingly define their job 
as m anaging, containing and attending to this social realm -  through edu­
cation, public health policy, policing, public administration, and welfare.
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Political economy grows with a vengeance, the state as a giant housekeeper, 
with a massive division of labor and social science apparatus. As a result 
people’s lives may be more or less well taken care of, and governm ent m ore 
or less efficient in its administration, bu t genuine public life sinks into the 
swamp of social need.
Despite wishing to preserve her vision o f the political, for the most part 
political theorists have rejected A rendt’s separation of the political from  the 
social, and her backward looking pessimism about the em ergence of mass 
social movements of the oppressed and disenfranchised. The m ore comm on 
judgem ent is that social justice is a condition of political freedom  and equal­
ity (Bernstein, 1986; cf. Conovan, 1978), understood as the ability to par­
ticipate actively in public affairs thtough word and deed. If we rule ou t eco­
nomic issues and issues of social and cultural relations as appropriate to a 
genuine public discussion, moreover, it is no t clear what active citizens have 
to talk about together (Pitkin, 1981).
In this essay I construct an account of political theory in the last two 
decades as thinking through the implications not of the eclipse o f the politi­
cal by the social, but rather of the politicization o f the social. The story I tell 
is of course a construction, from my own point o f view, which emphasizes 
some aspects o f political theorizing  in the last twenty-five years, and  
deemphasizes others. The theme of the politicization of the social, for ex­
ample, will lead me to say little about the massive literature in recen t politi­
cal theory which takes some aspect of the historical canon of political theory 
as its subject. Likewise I will make little reference to recent political theory 
that makes use of the techniques of rational choice theory. My story partly 
seeks to construct recent political theory as a response to contem porary social 
movements. The trends in political theory I reflect on find mass social move­
ments of poor and working class people, movements concerning labor, civil 
rights, feminism, and environmentalism, as the primary sites of active and 
participatory politics in the late twentieth century. Most of my attention will 
be on English-language political theory, though I will refer to some French 
and German writers.
My account divides the politicization o f the social in recen t political 
theory in to six sub-topics: social justice and welfare rights theory; dem o­
cratic theory; feminist political theory; postmodernism; new social movements 
and civil society; and the liberalism-communitarianism debate. Recogniz­
ing that many works in recent political theory overlap these categories, I 
nevertheless try to locate most works in one of them.
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I. Social Justice and Welfare Rights Theory
In 1979 Brian Barry could look back on two decades of political theory 
and find the first nearly barren and the second producing bum per crops 
(Barry, 1989). With him I will locate the publication o fjohn  Rawls’s A Theory 
of Justice (1971) as the turning point. It is no accident that the decade of the 
1960’s intervened between the barren field of political theory and the ap­
pearance of this groundbreaking book. Despite its rhetoric of timelessness, 
A Theory of Justice m ust be read as a product of the decade that preceded it. 
Would civil disobedience occupy a central chapter in a basic theory of jus­
tice today?
A Theory of Justice m apped a theoretical terrain from  the thicket of 
dem ands and responses to the Black civil rights movement and journalistic 
attention to poverty: social justice. Whatever Rawls’s insistence on the prior­
ity of the principle of equal liberty, most attention focused on Rawls’s sec­
ond  principle, which referred  to social and economic equality. W hether 
Rawls in tended  so or not, moreover, most interpreted A Theory of Justice as 
recom m ending an activist and interventionist role for government not only 
to prom ote liberties, bu t to bring about greater social and economic equal­
ity.
Hitherto principled political commitment to social equality and distribu­
tive economic justice were most associated with socialist politics. Insofar as 
commitment to such principles had made their way into public policy in liberal 
dem ocratic societies, many understood this as a result of the relative suc­
cess and  concessions from  the dom inant econom ic powers (Piven and 
Cloward, 1982; Offe, 1984). A Theory of Jus t ice presented norms of social and 
econom ic equality within a framework that claimed direct lineage with the 
liberal tradition.
A m ajor issue o f political conflict in the last two decades, as well as 
earlier, is about whether a liberal democratic state should legitimately aim 
to am eliorate social problem s and economic deprivation through public 
policy. If Rawls supplied the philosophical framework for one side in this 
debate, Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Nozick,1974) supplied a 
framework for the other. Is a politicized commitment to more egalitarian 
patterns of distributive social justice compatible with liberty or not? Many 
articles and collections of essays over this period debate this issue (Arthur 
and Shaw, 1978; Kipnis and Meyers, 1985).
Several political theorists continue the Rawlsian project of dem on­
strating that liberty is no t only compatible with greater social equality, but 
requires it. Amy G utm ann adds participatory democracy to the values that
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egalitarian liberalism must prom ote (Gutm ann, 1980). Contem porary no r­
mative argum ents for welfare rights, or a welfare liberal conception o f jus­
tice, similarly aim to systematize a social dem ocratic political program  con­
sistent with liberal values and explicitly refuting m ore libertarian in terp re­
tations of those values (Wellman,1982; Goodin, 1988; Sterba, 1988). Kai 
Nielsen argues for the compatibility o f liberty and equality in a m ore ex­
plicitly Marxist and socialist vein, devoting a large chunk of his argum ent 
to a refutation of Nozick (Nielsen, 1985). Even some Marxist inspired in ter­
pretations of justice aim to make an anti-exploitation social and  econom ic 
theory compatible with a Rawsian normative theory (Peffer, 1990; Reiman, 
1990). O thers insist, however, that different social class positions generate 
different pictures of society, and different incom patible, conceptions of 
justice (e.g., Miller, 1976). Thus Milton Fisk argues that liberal egalitarian­
ism is a contradictory normative theory responding to the contradictory social 
formation of welfare capitalism, and that both are the outcom e of an un­
easy class compromise (Fisk, 1989). I believe that there is considerable truth 
in the claim that both the liberal democratic welfare state and a normative 
theory that attempts to reconcile the liberal tradition with a com m itm ent to 
radical egalitarianism are fraught with tensions. Perhaps the prom ised third 
volume of Brian Barry’s Theories of Social Justice will fu rther clarify the re­
quirements o f just economic distribution.
With the publication of Charles Beitz’s Political Theory and International 
Relations, (Beitz, 1979), these issues of social justice came to be ex tended  to 
relations between peoples globally. Beitz argued that Rawls’s principles of 
justice could be used as the basis for evaluating and criticizing the distribu­
tive inequality between developed societies o f the N orth and less developed 
societies of the South. Political theorizing about social and economic inequal­
ity across national boundaries remains underdeveloped. Some im portan t 
work has begun, however, on immigration issues and international justice 
(Carens, Whalen, 1988); environm ent and international justice (Goodin, 
1990) ; hunger and obligations to distant peoples (Shue, 1980; O ’Neill, 1986).
II. Democratic Theory
Literature on social justice and welfare politicizes the social by asking 
whether government ought explicitly to try to am eliorate social oppression 
and inequality. But A rendt’s critique o f such expanded attention to the so­
cial as conceiving public life as social housekeeping m ight apply to m uch of 
this literature. With some exceptions, this literature tends to conceive citi­
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zens as rights bearers and receivers of state action, rather than as active par­
ticipants in public decision-making.
N urtured  by social movem ent calls for participatory democracy in the 
1960’s and 70’s, in the last two decades normative theorizing has flowered 
that takes speech and citizen participation as central. Carole Patem an’s still 
widely cited Participation and Democratic Theory (Pateman, 1970), set much 
of the agenda for contem porary participatory democratic theory. That work 
criticized a plebiscite and intergroup pluralist conception of democracy, and 
rea rticu la ted  an ideal o f dem ocracy as involving active discussion and 
decisonm aking by citizens. It argued that social equality is a condition of 
dem ocratic participation, and that democratic participation helps develop 
and preserve social equality. This means that the sites of democratic partici­
pation m ust include social institutions beyond the state in which people’s 
actions are directly involved, particularly the workplace.
C. B. M acpherson articulated a framework for critique of the passivity 
and utilitarianism  of dom inant conceptions of liberal democracy, and for 
an alternative m ore active conception of democracy. It is a measure of how 
m uch intellectual discourse has changed in the last twenty years that today 
reflection on conceptions of hum an nature seems quaint. Yet M acpherson’s 
analysis of political theories according to whether they assume the nature 
of hum an beings as primarily acquisitive consumers of goods or primarily 
as developers and  exercisers of capacities remains a useful way to orient 
dem ocratic political theory. The perspective of possessive individualism will 
inevitably regard the political process as a competition for scare goods, where 
the com petitors’ desire for accumulation knows no limits. If one redefines 
the hum an good as the developm ent and exercising of capacities, however, 
then  dem ocratic theory takes a wholly different turn. Distributive justice 
becomes only a means to the wider good of positive freedom, which is itself 
a social good because realized in cooperation with others. Freedom is the 
opportunity  to develop and exercise one’s capacities, and actively engaged 
citizen dem ocracy is both  a condition and expression of such freedom  
(M acpherson, 1973; 1978; cf. Carens, ed., 1992).
Several recent political theorists take as a basic values such an expanded 
notion o f freedom , as an absence of domination and positive capacity for 
self-realization and self-determination. Equality can be best understood as 
com patible with freedom  in this sense, rather than in the narrower, usually 
property-based sense o f freedom  as liberty from interference. Thus one 
aspect o f contem porary democratic theory concerns articulation of the con­
ditions o f genuine dem ocratic citizenship. People who are deeply deprived 
cannot be expected to exercise the virtues of democratic participation, and
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are seriously vulnerable to threats and coercion in the political process. Too 
often wealth or property function as what M ichael W alzer (1982) calls 
“dom inanat” goods: inequalities in these econom ic relations will generate 
inequalities in opportunity, power, influence, and the abilities to set o n e ’s 
own ends. So serious comm itm ent to democracy presupposes social meas­
ures that limit the degree of class inequality and guarantee that all citizens 
have their needs m et (Bay, 1981; Green, 1985; Cunningham , 1987; Cohen 
and Rogers, 1983). Most of those who theorize this relation o f social and 
political equality to democracy concentrate on issues o f class. Influenced by 
feminist analyses, however, a few notice the need to address issues o f the 
gender division o f labor to support political equality and  participation  
(Green, 1985; Walzer, 1982; Mansbridge, 1991).
Participatory approaches to democratic theory hold that democracy is 
a hollow set of institutions if they only allow citizens to vote on  representa­
tives to far away political institutions and protect those citizens from govern­
m ent abuse. A fuller democracy in principle means that people can act as 
citizens in all the major institutions which require their energy and obedi­
ence. As I will discuss in a later section of this paper, this conclusion has 
opened both contemporary political practice and theory to interest in civil 
associations outside both state and corporate life as the most promising sites 
of expanded democratic practice. Following Patem an’s lead, however, con­
temporary democratic theory has also shown a renewed interest in workplace 
democracy. Though practices of workplace democracy, several writers ar­
gue, citizens can both begin to realize the social and economic equality that 
they find a condition for democratic participation in the wider polity, and 
at the same time live the value of creative self-governance in one of the most 
regular and immediate aspects of m odern life (Schweickart, 1980; Dahl, 1978, 
Gould, 1988). The relative impotence of political theory in setting the agenda 
of political debate may be revealed by the fact that such thoroughly articu­
lated arguments have little influence on discussion of workplace practices.
At the beginning of the period I am reviewing, the theory of political 
democracy was largely identified with a theory of interest group pluralism. 
Inspired by contemporary participatory democratic experim ents and insti­
tutions, im portant critiques of this interest group pluralism em erged with 
well developed alternative conceptions of democracy based on active dis­
cussion. In Beyond Adversary Democracy,Jane M ansbridge (1980) argued that 
conceptualizing the democratic process as the com petition am ong interests 
is too narrow, and she offered a m odel o f ‘unitary’ dem ocracy as one in 
which participants aim at arriving at a com m on good through discussion. 
Wisely, she also argued that unitary democracy has limits, and suggested that
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both adversary and unitary democracy are necessary in a robustly demo­
cratic polity.
Benjamin Barber took up the impulse of this classification and critique, 
bu t argued in Strong Democracy (Barber, 1984) that an ideal of unitary de­
mocracy in too conform ist and collectivist. He proposed a model of strong 
democracy instead, as a participatory model in which citizens form together 
a public com m itent to a com m on good but where social pluralities of inter­
est and com m itm ent rem ain. It is not clear to me, however, that Barber’s 
and M ansbridge’s models are all that different.
Following these im portant texts, recent years have seen an explosion 
of theorizing about democracy as a discussion based form of practical rea­
son. Ideals and practices of democratic decisionmaking that emphasized rea­
soned discussion have received im portant further development and refine­
m en t (C ohen, 1989; Spragens, 1990; Sunstien, 1988; M ichelman, 1988; 
Dryzek, 1990; Fishkin, 1991). Though I consider this an extremely impor­
tan t trend  in contem porary  political theory, as currently articulated the 
notion o f deliberative democracy has at least two problems. On the whole 
the models too much assume the need for a unity of citizens as either a start­
ing poin t or goal of deliberation (Young, forthcom ing). Theories of delib­
erative democracy, moreover, have for the most part no t grappled with the 
facts of m odern  mass democracy that led to the development of a theory of 
interest group pluralism. O n the whole they have not considered the ques­
tion of democratic representation in large-scale mass polities. John Burnheim 
has put forward some creative ideas about a system of participatory based 
representation (Burnheim , 1985), and Charles Beitz (1989) and Norberto 
Bobbio (1984) have also given central consideration to this question. Fu­
ture work on the question of theorizing of structures of representation in a 
participatory and deliberative democracy would do well to build on the 
recen t m agnum  opus of the patriarch of liberal pluralism himself, Robert 
Dahl (Dahl, 1989).
III. Feminist Political Theory
Civil rights and poor people’s movements provide a context for theo­
rizing social justice and welfare rights. Experiments in participatory demo­
cratic practices in cooperatives, communes, and neighbourhood organisa­
tions fuel reconsideration of ideals of participatory and deliberative democ­
racy. The contem porary feminist movement has inspired perhaps the most 
sweeping reconceptualizations of political theory. As in every other discipline
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in the humanities and social sciences, feminist scholarship in political theory 
has questioned basic assumptions in the canon discourse itself, and proposed 
considered reconceptualizations of central ideas in the field. Feminist po­
litical theory involves politicizing the social by questioning a dichotom y of 
public and private and thereby proposing that family relations, sexuality, 
and the gendered relations of street school and workplace are properly 
political relations. That gender relations are political implies that they are 
structured by power, and that they are relations whose institutionalization 
ought to be subject to discussion, ra ther than em erging from  tradition.
In o ther disciplines bringing gender in to  focus m eant first m aking 
women visible -  a historical actors, as writers, artists, and scientists, and as 
persons with sex and gender specific problem s and experiences that m erit 
both empirical and normative study. W hole concern to make women vis­
ible has not been absent from feminist political theory, from the beginning 
the primary direction of gendering political theory has been to make its 
maleness visible.
Since the groundbreaking publication  o f a collection o f p ap er by 
Lorrenne Clark and Lynda Lange (1978) and Susan O kin’s Women in West­
ern Political Thought (1979), a large and sophisticated literature has grown 
analyzing and evaluating ideas of the canon writers of Western political theory 
from a feminist perspective. Most o f this has concentrated on classic m od­
ern theorists, but some feminist critique has exam ined ancient writers as 
well (Saxonhouse, 1976).
Feminist political theory deconstructs the public-private dichotomy that 
runs through the canon story in the following way. T he public realm  of 
politics can be so rational, noble, and universal only because the messy 
content of the body, meeting its needs, providing for production, caretak- 
ing, and attending to birth and death, are taken care o f elsewhere. Male 
heads of households derive their power to make wars, laws and philosophy 
from the fact that others work for them  in private, and it is no surprise that 
they would model nobility on their own experience. But a m odern reflex­
ive political theory should recognize that the glory of the public is dialecti- 
cally entwined with the exploitation and repression of the private, and the 
people restricted to that sphere so they can take care o f peop le’s needs. 
However the analysis proceeds, feminist political theory concludes that twen­
tieth century politics requires a basic rethinking of this distinction and its 
m eaning for politics (Elshtain, 1981; Nicholson, 1984; Young, 1987).
Much feminist political theory analyzes the masculinism of a universal 
reason that abhors embodim ent and honors the desire to kill and risk life 
(Hartsock, 1983; Brown, 1989). Beginning with the ancients, courage tops
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the list o f citizens virtues, which promotes the solders as the paradigm citi­
zen. Machiavelli is celebrated as the father both of m odern realpolitik and 
republicanism  because he fashions the account of political man so clearly 
relying on images of risk, danger, winning, and the competition of sport and 
battle. H annah Pitkin’s brilliant study of Machiavelli relies on feminist psy­
choanalysis as well as critiques of the public-private dichotomy to expose 
the grounds o f this masculinist citizen in a psychic opposition between self 
and o ther (Pitkin, 1984).
Many feminist critics focus on the idea of the social contract to uncover 
different assumptions about hum an nature, action and evaluation that ex­
hibit masculine experience and develop a one-sided account of the possi­
bilities o f political life and political change. Several have focused on the 
assumptions o f individualism, atomistic autonomy and independence that 
structure the image o f this rational citizen in m odern political thought. 
Carole Patem an argues that the idea of the individual assumed by social of 
individual assumes an independence from bodily caretaking that can only 
obtain if som eone else is doing it for one (Pateman, 1988). O ther feminist 
critics argue that the concept of the rational autonom ous individual of so­
cial contract theory carries an image of the person as self-originating, with­
out birth and dependence. If the original dependence of all hum an beings 
on others were to replace this assumption of self-generation, then the en­
tire edifice that constructs social relations as effects of voluntary bargains 
would collapse. Some writers have explored alternative starting points for a 
concep tion  o f society and the political, which begins with premises of 
connectedness and interdependence rather than autonomy and independ­
ence.
Feminist argum ents about individualism, the public-private dichotomy, 
contract theory, and the implicitly bias in Western ideas of reason and uni­
versality have influenced some work of male political theorists concerned 
with contem porary issues (e.g., Smith, 1991). But this work has had little 
influence on scholarship on ancient or m odern political theory. Consider­
ing the scope and analytic depth  that many feminist scholars have brought 
to exam ination of some of the most central ideas of the most central think­
ers, it is puzzling why o ther scholars apparently fell obliged neither to re­
vise their approaches in light o f these critiques nor give arguments against 
them.
Feminist theorists have devoted at least as much scholarly energy to 
contem porary political theory and practice. Feminists have subjected many 
of the im portant terms o f political discourse to searching analysis, includ­
ing power (Hartsock, 1983), authority (Jones, 1993), political obligations
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(Hirschmann, 1992), citizenship (Dietz, 1985; Bock and James, ed., 1992), 
privacy (Allen, 1989), democracy (Phillis, 1991), and justice (Okin, 1989).
The question and conclusions in this conceptual literature are extremely 
diverse, bu t the arguments tend to cluster around two projects. First, femi­
nist analysis argues that theories of justice, power, obligation, and  so on, 
reflect male gendered experience, and m ust be revised if they are to include 
female gendered experience. Often the criticism takes the form of arguing 
that the generality that political theorists claim for their concepts and theo­
ries cannot in fact be general because the theories do no notice the fact o f 
gender difference and take these into account in form ulating their theories. 
Thus Susan Okin argues, for example, that Walzer’s argum ents about jus­
tice become inconsistent when the facts of male dom ination within com m u­
nities are taken into account.
Second, these conceptual analyses often claim that political theory too 
often tends to disem body these central political concepts. Thus Nancy 
Hartsock argues, for example, that dom inant theories of power repress the 
relation childhood experience of vulnerability, and presume a rigid self-other 
dichotomy that reduces power to com petition and control. Thinking power 
in terms of em bodim ent would draw the attention of political theorists to 
power as power-to and not simply power-over (cf. W artenberg, 1990). Much 
feminist discussion about the concept o f equality, to take ano ther example, 
has questioned whether equal respect for women should imply identical 
treatm ent to men, because women experience pregnancy and childbirth, 
and suffer o ther vulnerabilities because o f sexist society (Bacchi, 1990).
IV. Post modernism
Most of the humanities and social science disciplines have been deeply 
rattled  in the last two decades by the style o f th ink ing  usually called  
postmodernism. Political theory has been affect by this current, though the 
challenges and questions posed by postm odernism  seem to nibble a t the 
edges of the discipline rather that being felt at the core. Much would be gained 
and little lost, in my opinion, by a m ore sustained engagem ent by m ore 
political theorists with the implications of postm odern critiques o f m odern 
norms and ideals of subjectivity.
The work of Michel Foucault stands perhaps m ost directly as a tower­
ing contribution to political theory, at the same time as it challenges many 
of its traditional assumptions. Foucault thinks that political theory and dis­
course continue to assume a paradigm of politics derived from a pre-m od­
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ern  experience, and that since the eighteenth century a new structuration 
o f power has operated. The old paradigm still assumed by most political 
theory conceives power as sovereignty: the titular unity of the state, which 
hands down decrees to its subject that say what is allowed and forbidden. In 
this regime power is experienced as negative, the repressive force of prohi­
bition and punishm ent.
M odern political institutions have shifted from a regime of sovereignty 
to governmentality: the application of principles and techniques of (patri­
archal) household m anagem ent to public institutions. Now the king and his 
agents do no t reach out from  the center to control the unruly subjects with 
fear. Instead ruling institutions percolate up from the ground, in the outly­
ing capillaries of society, which discipline bodies to conform with norms of 
reason, o rder and good taste, for their own good. Power proliferates and 
becomes productive in the emergence of disciplinary institutions that organ­
ize and m anage people in a complex division of labor: hospitals and clin­
ics, schools, prisons, welfare organizations, police department. Contrary to 
its self-conception, the scientific mood of Enlightenment rationality does not 
generate a world o f freedom  beyond power, but a new set of microprocesses 
o f power, which engage as well as constrain. Scientists and professionals 
themselves, ra ther than kings and presidents, are primary agents of this 
power, exercised through social scientific and managerial knowledge. Power 
operates less as juridical rules and more as scientifically and professionally 
defined codes of norm al and deviant (Foucault, 1979; 1980; Burchell, et. 
al., 1991).
Foucault certainly theorizes the politicization of the social. He describes 
strategies of power throughout the social body, in m undane corners of in­
stitutional life such as settlem ent houses or therapists’ offices. His account 
of how principles of governmentality transfer techniques of home economy 
to public life has striking echoes with Arendt’s story of the emergence of the 
social; it also resonates with Haberm as’s notion of the colonization of the 
lifeworld, that I will discuss below. Political theory has yet fully to absorb 
and evaluate their picture o f power as the productive and proliferating proc­
ess o f disciplinary institutions. William Connolly has taken a leading role in 
showing Foucault’s ideas as a challenge to political theory’s uncritical reli­
ance on Enlightenm ent ideas. He argues that norms are always double-sided 
and ambiguous, and that we should resist the bureaucratic impulse to disci­
pline ambiguity (Connolly, 1982). A few political theorists have examined 
the concept of power in light of Foucault’s work (Philip, 1983; Smart, 1983; 
W artenberg, 1990; Spivak, 1992; H onneth, 1991). More engagem ent with
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Foucault’s ideas will require rethinking the concept o f state, law, authority, 
obligation, freedom, and rights, as well.
The critical force of Foucault’s analyses is apparent. But this theoriz­
ing cries out for normative ideals of freedom  and justice by means o f which 
to evaluate institutions and practices. Several political theorists make im por­
tant arguments that Foucault’s theorizing is implicitly contradictory because 
he refuses to articulate such positive ideals (Taylor, 1984; Fraser, 1989; 
Habermas, 1990, Chap 9 and 10).
Several other French writers associated with postm odernism  have been 
im p o rta n t for po litical theory, in c lu d in g  L acan , D errid a , L yo tard , 
Baudrillard, and Kristeva. I will discuss only a few o ther them es that arise 
for political theory out of the work o f these writers.
Postmodern thinkers have questioned an assumption that unified indi­
vidual subject are the units of society and political action. Subjectivity is a 
product of language and interaction, no t its origin, and subject are as inter­
nally plural and contradictory as the social field in which they live. This 
ontological thesis raises serious questions for political theory abou t the 
meaning of moral and political agency. In terpreting Merleau-Ponty along 
with some of the others I have m entioned above, Fred Dallmayr offers a 
vision of political process where a desire to control dissipates (Dallmayr, 
1981).
Several writers take up the Derridian critique o f a metaphysics o f proc­
ess to argue that a desire for certainty and clear regulatory principles in 
politics has the consequences of repressing and oppressing otherness, both 
in other people and in oneself (Young, 1986; White, 1991). In Identity/Dif­
ference William Connolly gives a twist to this thesis by claiming tha t such 
unifying politics produces a resentm ent too quick to blame and no t open 
enough to ambiguity (Connolly, 1991). Bonnie Honig applies these sorts of 
arguments to the texts of political theorists such as Kant, Rawls and Sandel; 
she argues that their desire for a unifying theoretical center in political theory 
oppressively expels subject who deviate from their models o f rational citi­
zen and community (Honig, 1993).
I find the most important consequence of postm odern critiques of iden­
tifying thinking to lie in a reinterpretation of democratic pluralism. Dem o­
cratic politics is a field of shifting identities and groups that find affinities 
and contest with one another (Yeatman, 1994). Ernesto Laclau and Chantai 
Mouffe’s book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, (1985) has been influential 
along these lines. They argue that the Marxist concept of the revolutionary 
agency of the working class is a metaphysical fiction inappropriate to the 
contem porary period of proliferating radical social movements defined by
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m ultiple identities and interests. Radical democratic politics should be un­
derstood as the coalescing of plural social movements in civil society, to 
deepen dem ocratic practice both in the state and society. I heartily endorse 
a political theory that appreciates social heterogeneity and is suspicious of 
efforts to unify (see Young, 1990). Much of this writing, however, seems ei­
ther to identify normative standards of justice and freedom  as themselves 
suspicious, or no t to refer to issues of freedom and justice at all. The task 
for a political theory sensitive to the repressive implications of identifying 
logic and exclusionary normalization is to develop methods of appealing to 
justice less subject to these criticisms.
V. New Social Movements and Civil Society
I have suggested that we m ight understand many of the im portant de­
velopments of contem porary political theory as expressions of and responses 
to contem porary political movements that focus critical reflection on social 
relations not traditionally though of as political. I have m entioned some of 
these already, particularly the wom en’s movement. In the last twenty years 
movements have proliferated whose style and demands go beyond claims 
for rights or welfare: environm entalism, peace movements, group based 
movements o f national resistance and cultural pride, gay and lesbian lib­
eration. Some recent social and political theory conceptualizes the political 
styles and implications of these sorts of movements, often called “new social 
m ovem ents” (Melucci, 1989; Boggs, 1986; West, 1990, Moors and Sears, 
1992).
These movements are called “new” for at least two reasons. First, on 
the whole their issues do no t primarily concern inclusion in basic citizen­
ship rights no r the enlargem ent of economic rights. Their issues are more 
specifically social -  respect and self-determination for cultural difference, 
responsibility and pluralism in everyday lifestyle, reflection on power in social 
in teraction, participation in decisions in social and economic, as well as 
political, institutions. Secondly, the from of organization of these movements 
does no t replicate the mass movement from of political party or union, a 
unified bureaucracy seeking power though resource mobilization. Instead, 
these new social movements tend to be networks of more local groups, each 
with their own principles and style, that nevertheless act in concern en masse 
in some protest actions.
Some im portant political theory reflects systematically on the norma­
tive political principles em bodied in some of these movements. The envi­
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ronm ental movement, for example, provides substance for reflection on 
basic normative issues o f value, social rationality, and dem ocratic participa­
tion (Sagoff, 1989; Goodin, 1991; Dryzek, 1988; Ekersley, 1993).
Despite the importance of anti-racist social movements emphasizing self- 
determ ination, cultural pluralism and reparations for past injustice, there 
has been surprisingly little work by political theorists about race and rac­
ism. In this connection, Cornel West’s work must count as m aking im por­
tant contributions to political theory (West, 1982; 1992), along with the work 
of philosophers such as Bernard Boxill (1984), Howard McGary and Bill 
Lawson (1992). Andrew Sharp’s carefully argued book , Justice and the Maori, 
stands as a model of theorizing of indigenous peop le’s m ovem ent in the 
context of advanced industrial society. Some political theorists in Australia 
and Canada have begun to take up the challenge o f normative theorizing 
about indigenous peoples issues (Carens, 1994; Kymlicka, 1993). Though 
there is significant work on indigenous peoples issues by legal theorists in 
the United State (e.g., Williams, 1990), I see few signs that U.S. philosophers 
and political theorists are reflecting on the specific normative issues con­
cerning Native Americans.
Some recent theorizing about the role o f state and bureaucracy in ad­
vanced industrial societies helps set a context for understanding the new 
social services holds that such operations o f disciplinary social power also 
create their own resistances. Along somewhat different lines, Claus Offe gives 
an account of the m odern welfare state as having depoliticizied processes of 
social control and public spending. The state has becom e an arena where 
officials conduct their real business m ore or less behind  closed doors, and 
experts administer policies with a technical know-how that does no t bring 
normative ends into view. Social movements politicize some of this activity 
from a positions outside state institutions (Offe, 1984).
In his concept of the “colonization of the lifeworld”, Jü rgen  Haberm as 
offers a theoretical context for conceptualizing the m eaning of new social 
movements. State and corporate institutions in the twentieth century, he 
claims, develop complex production and administrative activities that are 
guided by technical reason, and increasingly “uncoupled” from the every­
day life context of meaningful cultural interaction. The activities and affects 
of these tehnicized economic and administrative system, further, come back 
to regulate and restructure the everyday lifeworld in accordance with its own 
imperatives (Habermas, 1983). The natural wilderness is restructured to a 
them e park, or everyday consum ption is rules by spatial and  packaging 
decisions that serve the interests of profit rather than consum er desire. This 
theory interprets many new social movements as a reaction to this coloniza­
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tion o f the lifeworld. People seek through their political action to open 
greater space for collective choice about normative and aesthetic ends, and 
to limit the influence of the systemic imperatives of power and profit.
If it is true that state activity is largely technicized, then state institutions 
cannot function as the site of deliberative politics in advanced capitalist so­
ciety. Rather, politics, in the sense of people meeting together to discuss their 
collective problem s, raise critical claims about action, and act together to 
alter their circumstances, happens more in critical public spheres outside 
the state and directed at its action. Habermas’s major work of the early 1960’s 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas, 1962; 1989), 
has received new attention by political theorists interested in participatory 
politics and critical normative discourse in late twentieth century society 
(Calhoun, 1991).
For the purpose of such theorizing, a concept of civil society as the locus 
of free and deliberative politics has been emerging. The concept of civil 
society was used in the opposition movements of Eastern Europe through­
out the 1980’s, and  this usage has influenced some of these theoretical de­
velopments. The concept has also been influential in opposition movements 
in South Africa and Latin America.
Leading proponents of the theory of civil society are John Keane (1984; 
1988), Jean  Cohen (1983) and Andrew Arato (Arato and Cohen, 1992). 
These theorists draw on Haberm as’s analyses of late capitalism to argue that 
the sphere of civil society, as distinct from both state and corporate economy, 
as the primary locus of politics, in the sense of people deliberating together 
about their collective life and raising normative issues about how things ought 
to be. Civil society consists in voluntary associative activity -  the array of civil 
associations, non-profit service organizations, and so on, in which people 
participate that are only loosely connected to state and corporate economy. 
Civil society is the arena in which social movements flower. Activities of civil 
society do require a strong liberal state that protest the liberties of speech, 
association and assembly. But the activities of civil society are more directly 
participatory than the way citizens relate to state decisionmaking appara­
tus.
Both Cohen and Arato and Keane thus look to civil society as the arena 
for deepening and radicalizing democracy. The public spheres of civil soci­
ety can and should be enlarged by pushing back the bureaucratized func­
tions o f the state and structuring more areas of social life in terms of volun­
tary participatory organizations. These civil organizations can also serve as 
the stage from which to launch criticism of state policy and action. The pro­
gram of radical democracy can be furthered, finally, by the creation within
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corporate institutions of workplace democracy, which have the voluntary and 
participatory character of civil association. Thus the vision o f social change 
em bodied in the theory of civil society sees a proliferation of groups and 
activities, with somewhat different issues and concerns, prom oted  limited 
goals of social transformation all of which involve expanding the possibili­
ties for democratic participation. Such a vision coincides with the ideas of 
some of the contem porary theorists of participatory democracy and with 
postm odern theorists like Laclau and Mouffe.
I find the social theory of bureauratization and com m odification that 
the theory of civil society relies on useful. Thus I find attractive the idea that 
institutions and movements of civil society are the primary arena for poli­
tics in the Arendtian sense of people moving out from preoccupation with 
their private lives to m eet and discuss their collective issues. Looking to civil 
activity as the place where active deliberation and dem ocratic egalitarian­
ism can be prom oted and deepened, moreover, is im portant.
The political theory of civil society, however, seems to have occluded 
some concerns that are more apparent when theorizing focuses on what state 
policy ought to do, namely concerns about economic inequality. New social 
movement theorizing retains these concerns to same degree. But in their 
emphasis on cultural issues and the politics o f identity, concerns about ac­
cess to and power over resources seem less salient.
The concept of civil society is also ambiguous about issues o f economic 
justice. Not all theorizing about civil society and political theory distinguishes 
between the economy and civil society as Cohen and Arato do. O ften the 
theorizing that does identifies the freedom  of civil society also with the free­
dom of the market (see, e.g., Kukathas and Lovell, 1991). T hen the theory 
of civil society emerges as a new form of anti-state liberalism, particularly 
arguing that state intervention in econom ic activity for the purposes o f re­
distribution or responding to social needs unjustifiably interferes with free­
dom. Since all civil society theorizing agrees that m odern welfare state bu­
reaucracies tend to be undem ocratic and dominative, there is a real ques­
tion of how a commitment to the active prom otion o f social justice can be 
made compatible with this view of politics and democracy (Young, forthcom ­
ing).
VI. Liberalism and Communitarianism
Michael Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) levelled an 
ontological critique at the concept o f self Sandel claimed Rawls presupposed
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in his theory o f justice. Rawls’s account presupposes a moral self prior to 
social relationships guided by principles of justice, Sandel argued, a self 
“unencum bered” by particular culture and commitments into which he or 
she is thrown. Principles of justice generated from such an abstract notion 
o f self can serve only to regulate public relations among strangers in the 
m ost formalistic way. For a robust political theory of social union, Sandel 
suggested, justice m ust be supplem ented by recognition of particular com­
munity bonds and comm itm ents that constitute selves.
In After Virtue, Alistair MacIntyre (1983) levelled a more historically 
o rien ted  challenge to liberalism. The economic and ideological changes of 
m odern society create a m odern dilemma of relativism. Religious and moral 
questions -  questions about the good, the just, the virtuous -  have become 
m atters of private conscience or contesting political opinion. Liberalism is 
a system of form al adjudication among such competing and incommensu­
rate opinions am ong which there is no means of deciding some are right 
and others wrong. In this m odern world-view moral agents are released onto 
the landscape as disconnected, commodified and often cynical atoms. The 
late m odern malaise can best be treated by looking for living communities 
o f shared values and virtues that can serve as contem porary analogues of 
medieval guild communities, and other traditional self-ruling communities 
bound by com m on com m itm ent to particular excellences.
Com m unitarianism  can be in terpreted  as a form of politicizing the 
social. It claims to anchor political values like justice, rights, freedom, in 
particular social and cultural contexts. Thus it interprets the social as prior 
to and constitutive of the political. Its ontological critique of liberalism 
rejects abstract individualism. Its political critique suggests that liberal norms 
and values implausibly claim to transcend and bracket particular cultural 
c o n tex ts , a n d  to app ly  to all societies in the sam e way. B ut som e 
com m unitarian discussion suggested that culture shapes moral norms, and 
that these culturally based values may sometimes conflict with liberal norms. 
Liberals then wondered whether it wasn’t communitarian which sent us down 
a road o f normative relativism coupled with intolerant particularism.
By the mid 1980’s the so-called liberalism-communitarian debate was 
flooding the pages ofjournals and books in political theory. But the debate 
was both too abstract and founded on a false dichotomy. Despite the fact 
that the aim o f com m unitarians was to situate moral and political norms in 
the particular social contexts of full blooded agents, they rarely discussed 
any particular communities (cf. Wallach, 1987). It was difficult to find, moreo­
ver, any com m unitarian who would reject liberal values of equal respect, 
freedom  of action, speech and association, or tolerance (cf. Gutman, 1985).
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Few self-proclaimed liberals, on the o ther hand, were ready to deny the 
power of particular cultural com m itm ent in individual lives, though they 
might disagree with communitarians about the normative significance of 
these facts.
The liberalism-communitarianism debate did expose how m uch con­
temporary liberal political theory abstracts from social group affiliation and 
comm itm ent to consider individuals only as individuals. In thus posed indi­
viduals. It thus posed an im portant challenge o f w hether and how liberal 
theory ought to include recognition of particular contexts of social and cul­
tural group difference. Will Kymlicka’s Liberalism, Community and Culture 
(1989) represents a turning point in this debate. Unlike many writings in 
this discussion, Kymlicka is not abstract about comm unity and culture, bu t 
rather discusses the particular cultural and political situations o f Native 
peoples in relation to the liberal state of Canada. Staunchly adhering to the 
values of m odern political liberalism, Kymlicka argues that these are not 
only compatible with, but require, the constitutions o f cultural rights that 
may sometimes imply special rights for endangered or oppressed cultural 
minorities. The key to his argum ent that such cultural rights follow from 
liberalism is his construction of individual rights as including an individual 
right to cultural membership, and thus to the m aintenance of the culture of 
which one is a member.
Another Canadian contributor to this m ore contextualized discussion 
of cultural rights, Charles Taylor, is less certain that a principle o f cultural 
recognition is compatible with at least some versions of liberalism (Taylor, 
1992). If we understand liberalism to require a universality to the statem ent 
of rights, such that laws and rules should apply equally to all in the same 
way, then politically recognizing and m aintaining particular cultures sits 
uneasily with liberalism. The recognition and preservation o f m inority cul­
tures may require special treatm ent and special rights for which there are 
good moral arguments, but arguments beyond the liberal individualist tra­
dition (cf. Young, 1989; 1990, especially C hapter 6).
A different set of recent works has also aim ed to produce a reconcilia­
tion between the stances of liberalism and com m unitarianism  that were 
posited in the early 1980’s. Liberalism has typically been interpreted as neutral 
among values and equally accepting of ways of life as long as their activities 
leave one another alone. Communitarianism, on the o ther hand, especially 
in MacIntyre’s version, takes the good, as the ends o f action, and virtue, as 
the disposition to bring about these good ends, as the m oral com m itm ent 
that liberalism has abandoned to relativism. Some writers have rejected 
the characterization of liberalism as neutral am ong ends and virtues, and
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have argued that liberalism itself implies particular cultural values, norm a­
tive ends, and behavioral virtues (Macedo, 1990; Galston, 1991).
It is fitting to end my story of two decades of political theory by refer­
ring to the same writer with whom I began: John  Rawls. The arguments of 
Political Liberalism (1993) are, to a significant degree, attempts to respond 
to the liberalism-communitarianism debate and the social context of multi- 
culturalism in liberal society. Rawls moves in the opposite direction from 
Kymlicka and some of the o ther writers who aim to reconcile the values of 
political liberalism with public recognition for particular cultural norms and 
ways of life. Freedom  and respect for particular “comprehensive doctrines,” 
as he calls them , instead requires that they all agree on a set of principles 
guiding the interaction of distinct communities, but transcending them all. 
M ulticulturalism is possible in a liberal society only if we re-draw a fairly 
clear border between what is properly public, the business of the constitu­
tional and legal rules governing the whole society, and what is private, in 
the sense o f m atters of individual and community conscience and commit­
ment.
Although the overlapping consensus that Rawls believes is produced 
by the willingness of different cultures and communities of conscience to set 
fair terms of cooperation retains attention to social and economic inequal­
ity as well as liberty, I find this work to constitute a retreat from the social. 
Rawls thinks that conflicts and ambiguities produced by the being together 
of concrete comm unities, about issues of sexuality, family, video content, 
religious dress in public, and countless other issues, are best handled by 
reestablishing a legal and political discourse that only admits into its realm 
issues already fram ed in terms of generalizable norms. Many today believe 
that the dem ands of social need, social context, value conflict, and conflict 
over public recognition for minority cultures and ways of life, have over­
loaded political institutions. They thus think that the only solution is for the 
political institutions to restrict themselves to enforcing the criminal law, 
protecting constitutional liberties, and organizing small bits of aid for the 
very needy. The boundary of the political should be redrawn to exclude the 
social.
While Rawls him self continues to say that the difference principle is 
im portant, the emphasis in Political Liberalism is on the procedural mecha­
nisms for arriving at and m aintaining committed consensus on civil rights 
and liberties. Proposals to redistribute wealth and income so as to maxi­
mize the expectations o f the least advantaged are much more controversial 
today than they were twenty years ago, even as the ranks of the least advan­
taged have been  swelling. Being less advantaged overlaps significantly,
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moreover, with social positioning in terms o f race, gender, ethnicity, and  
culture. Thus political claims about family values or recognition for cul­
tural minorities have much to do with claims o f social justice. Even where 
less tied to issues, of economic disadvantaged, the “politics o f identity,” 
whereby groups make claims for public recognition of the specificity of their 
cultural values, are not going away. For all these reasons the cu rren t tem p­
tation of political theory to retreat from the social threatens to make it even 
more irrelevant to politics than usual. Fortunately, there are signs that many 
political theorists will continue engaging these fiercely difficult political is­
sues of the late twentieth century.
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